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Democracy and coercive diplomacy

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Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between government and opposition parties influences threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. Compared to their nondemocratic counterparts, democracies make threats more selectively, but those they do make are more likely to be successful--that is, to gain a favorable outcome without war. Schultz uses game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Cambridge studies in international relations ; 76

Call Number

[POL-LIB-484]

Publisher

enk : Cambridge University Press., 2001

Collation

xv, 301 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

9780521792271

Classification

JZ6374 .S38 2001

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

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Subject(s)

International relations
Democracy
Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes
Threats

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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